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Part 1 Introduction
If states bent on criminal behavior know that frontiers are not an absolute defense, if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not embark on such a course of action in the expectations of sovereign immunity….Massive and systemic violations of human rights-wherever they may take place-should not be allowed to stand. He went on to interpret the UN Charter as "a living document whose high principles still define the aspirations of peoples everywhere for lives of peace, dignity, and development….Nothing in the charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders." 2 What's remarkable about his ideas is that they really aren't new. Immediately after the Gulf War, former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar observed the world was
"clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." 3 Interventions spurred by human rights abuses in recent decades include India in Pakistan (1971) , Vietnam in Cambodia (1978) , and Tanzania in Uganda (1979.) Moreover, in the 1990s, the stabilizing influence of a bipolar world disappeared with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Emerging nationalism and intrastate conflicts erupted with vicious fervor, fracturing nations along ethnic and religious faults. Since 1989, sovereignty has been compromised in the name of human rights in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and East
Timor, among others. Situations sparking "humanitarian interventions" challenge a consistent policy for United States (US) participation because of competing legal, moral, and political issues. Fundamental legal tensions exist in international law between rights of sovereign states to act as political agents for their collective societies, and an individual's basic human rights that are recognized in custom and by agreements or conventions. When the state fails to meet its citizens' physical needs or attempts to deprive basic human rights-for example, life and property-military intervention may be the only viable means to restore those rights. Yet sovereignty provides a critical freedom for political communities to self-determine without outside intervention. Clearly, moral dilemmas will emerge when military force is introduced to restore individual rights at the expense of sovereignty. The Western "just war" tradition, originating with Saint Augustine, and developed by other great thinkers, provides a useful framework to discuss such moral controversies. In particular, the just war concepts of just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance of success, and last resort help assess the unique moral issues in humanitarian interventions. Further, obviously, moral standards may call for intervention in many cases, but political realities and limited resources make consistent action difficult to execute in the real world.
This discussion broadly considers some of the legal, moral, and political factors that make humanitarian interventions so controversial. In particular, it focuses on Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo as the most recent example of an intervention involving significant military force for a primarily humanitarian cause. The analysis first addresses the state sovereignty question-specifically protected in the UN Charter, but falling short of satisfying human rights trends in international law. It moves on to introduce jus ad bellum standards of just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance of success, and last resort in humanitarian interventions.
Political and moral contradictions are then examined within these standards, suggesting the recent Kosovo operation met the just war standards, but not without reservation. Operation ALLIED FORCE clearly illuminated the troubling legal, moral, and political issues that often accompany armed humanitarian interventions, demanding that future similar actions be subject to disciplined analysis before action. 
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Kofi Annan's adamant statement seems morally laudable, but challenges the internationally cherished value of national sovereignty. It is controversial because it exposes the tension between the human rights of individuals within states, and the need for an ordered international system that respects the state as the political agent of those individuals. This need for order has made state sovereignty the cornerstone of international relations for several centuries. In the modern international system, the UN Charter establishes sovereignty as a fundamental principle in Chapter I, Article 2, particularly in 2(1), 2(3) and 2(4):
1. The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members. 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 51 offers the other exception, which permits use of armed force for acts of selfdefense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace an security.
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These portions of positive international law seem clear on the issue of sovereignty. They do not specifically provide for breaches of sovereignty with armed force for humanitarian reasons.
As modern states (since the 19 th century) have progressed into more interdependent relationships, however, commentaries on the Charter suggest a progression from "international law of coexistence" to "international law of cooperation." Sovereignty has evolved from being an end in itself, to becoming a means to an end for states to cooperate in securing common interests, yet still maintain international order. Among those common interests are the "welfare interests of their constituent peoples." 5 These welfare interests include the ability of constituents to selfdetermine the nature of government and the social order under which they live. Sovereignty assists the other international ideal of "nonintervention," deemed necessary to protect the individual political rights of constituents to determine the character of their political community.
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Even when that community is politically repressed, or experiencing civil war, nonintervention is critical to allow self-determination. Michael Walzer, a self-acknowledged proponent of nonintervention, notes:
So it seems best that people who have lived together in the past and will have to do so in the future should be allowed to work out their difficulties without imperial assistance among themselves. The resolution won't be stable unless it is locally grounded; there is little chance that it will be consensual unless it is locally produced.
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Yet conversely, today, a moral dilemma arises when a state abuses individual human rights on a scale which shocks human consciences (as with genocide or slavery for example); or is unable or unwilling to respond to disasters or other extreme human suffering. Strict respect for nonintervention may result in the sacrifice, by large numbers of people, of natural law rights to life, freedom, and property. John Charvet (London School of Economics) concludes:
The recognition of human rights in international law can be seen to be required by the ideal basis of its authority. For on the general will theory of the sovereignty of a state, the authority of any state over its citizens depends on its recognition of their equal rights to the basic human goods of life, liberty and property; on this basis a state that lacks such authority should not be recognized as a valid member of international society..…On this view, the general will of the states, is ultimately composed of all the general wills of the members of those states. In this sense, the ultimate sovereign of international society is humanity as organized into distinct states. 20 In the end, legalities may conflict with the moral forces that must sometimes compel multilateral or unilateral interventions-even without UN Security Council support.
Operation ALLIED FORCE's Legal Issues
The NATO intervention in Kosovo provides an excellent example of Randelzhofer's point. The offensive action of the Kosovo air war contradicted the defensive mandate of NATO.
However, the NATO alliance could claim, congruent with a US argument citing a threat to international peace and security, that the operation acted to defend stability in the European theater. Under general international law, the UK argued that previous UN resolutions in Bosnia and Somalia established legal precedent for humanitarian interventions. Moreover, in October 1998, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Officer clearly articulated the need for a timely response to avert a humanitarian disaster:
There is convincing evidence of an impending humanitarian catastrophe (SCR 1199 and the UNSG's and UNHCR's reports). We judge on the evidence of FRY handling of Kosovo throughout this year that a humanitarian catastrophe cannot be averted unless Milosevic is dissuaded from further repressive acts, and that only the proposed threat of force will achieve this objective….if action through the Security Council is not possible, military intervention by NATO is lawful on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.
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Taking a different approach, the US turned to the threat to international peace and security and considered the destabilization of neighboring countries as a central argument for legitimacy.
Germany and France attacked the issue with a combination of arguments. They interpreted the intent of UN resolutions 1160 and 1199 provided for the use of force and also emphasized the unique emergency nature of the human situation. 28 Clearly, this intense effort by NATO reflects the continued reluctance of nations to reject sovereignty without international legal legitimacy and compelling human rights arguments.
Legal Conclusions on Kosovo
Standing alone, the UN Charter does not legally support the NATO armed intervention without the Security Council's specific authorization. China and Russia's specific opposition to force in their voting statements on Resolution 1203 emphasized the lack of support. Yet, the absence of adequate international law to address humanitarian interventions does not eradicate the moral and political imperatives that may be present. In his article, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo," Adam Roberts best acknowledges the legal difficulties:
The question of the military means pursued by NATO to secure the proclaimed political and humanitarian ends was bound to affect judgements about the legality of the operation. NATO's reliance on bombing did give rise to questions….about its appropriateness so far as protecting the inhabitants of Kosovo was concerned, and about its conformity with the laws of war.
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This recent humanitarian intervention may stand on shaky legal grounds, but the debate's controversy suggests that NATO had substance for action on moral grounds. In this case, moral judgments by NATO leaders carried more weight than international law under the UN Charter.
Up to this point, the discussion has considered the importance of sovereignty in the international system; suggests a traditional debate exists between individual and state rights in respecting sovereignty; establishes the general definition of humanitarian intervention; and discusses Kosovo as a recent study in the legal debate over such interventions. Aside from the legal contradictions, cases like Kosovo illuminate the competing moral and political factors that must be weighed in each unique situation. The just war tradition provides an appropriate framework to explore these factors. To begin, it's helpful to review the just war principles governing decisions to initiate war-jus ad bellum factors-which might be debated in considering such operations. 
Part 3 JUS AD BELLUM PRINCIPLES
Although Saint Augustine is considered by many to be the father of the modern just war tradition, the ideas of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius refine and expand Augustine's jus ad bellum concepts with more secular emphasis. In Summa Theologica, using Roman ideas from Cicero, Aquinas described the concept of "natural law," saying , "It follows therefore that natural law in its first common principles is the same among all men, both as to validity and recognition (i.e. something is right for all and is so by all recognized.)" 1 This very important principle establishes that natural laws exist which apply to all individuals. It thereby forms the foundation for customary law (dynamic norms and standards internationally recognized and respected, even if not documented) and positive law (documented agreements in treaties, charters, conventions, etc). Aquinas expanded Augustine's jus ad bellum conditions (further completed by Grotius), introducing the concept of proportionality and the doctrine of double effect:
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental…Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end.
Although this idea was intended to evaluate morality of self-defense, it carries over to other aspects of just war. Unintended bad effects are weighed against the intended good effects to determine if they remain proportional to the good effect. If so, then the war may be considered just, if all the other just war criteria have been met. In the case of a humanitarian intervention, this idea of proportionality is very important and can be complicated by the unique nature of these endeavors-more discussion on this later. 
Just Cause
For Grotius, just cause meant that an injury had occurred. This could mean an act of selfdefense was necessary or that some violation of rights warranted a response with force. Often, humanitarian interventions have responded to aggressive acts taken by states against groups of its constituents. Although the abuses frequently occurred in the context of civil wars or secessionist movements, the interventions were warranted based on the scope and indiscriminate nature of the aggression against noncombatants. Walzer writes:
Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind." The old-fashioned language seems to me exactly right. It is not the conscience of political leaders that one refers to in such cases….The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired in the course of their everyday activity. The government of Pakistan.…literally turned an army loose on its own people.…a Punjabi army loose on the Bengali people….The army was not entirely without direction; its officers carried "death lists" on which appeared the names of the political, cultural, and intellectual leaders of Bengal. There was also a systematic effort to slaughter the followers of these people: university students, political activists and so on. Beyond these groups, the soldiers ranged freely, burning, raping, killing. 
Just Cause and Kosovo
Kosovo provides another example of just cause for intervention. Although an internal political struggle existed between the KLA and the Serb government, Milosevic's well-planned strategy to terrorize and expel Kosovo's Albanian population showed no discrimination between combatants and noncombatants. In fact, his objective was to isolate the KLA by assaulting and ethnically cleansing the ethnic Albanian population. 
Proportionality
Similarly, proportionality offers perhaps the most difficult jus ad bellum standard in interventions and it must be reevaluated for relevance even after hostilities commence. The introduction of military force, with expected collateral civilian casualties and property damage, makes the decision to use such measures-in the name of human rights-morally and politically controversial in democratic societies. Assuredly, innocent people can be expected to lose their basic rights to life and property in collateral damage incidents, regardless of sincere efforts to minimize the damage. Political leaders can expect these events to fuel the fire of opposition for forceful humanitarian interventions. In response to the moral dilemma, ironically, civilian and military leaders now more readily turn to air power as a "clean" answer to this difficult issue.
The remarkable advances in military technology provide significant improvement to targeting accuracy and reduced potential for collateral damage. Such advancement, coupled with political reluctance to accept friendly casualties, tempts politicians to see airpower as a panacea for the complexities of humanitarian interventions. The irony is that airpower may make proportionality in the conflict more acceptable, morally and politically. Therefore military intervention may be more readily employed in lieu of skillfully exercised diplomacy and negotiation, backed by a credible military deterrent.
Proportionality and the Balkans
In spite of its effectiveness, the use of airpower in the ongoing Balkan conflicts suggests political leaders may rely too heavily on it for bloodless solutions to complex problems. In 1993-1994, "US political leaders were the most outspoken advocates of the punitive use of airpower in the Balkans." 9 Operation DENY FLIGHT escalated into Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in 1995, with airpower used as the weapon of choice to leverage diplomatic efforts to bring Serbs to conclusive peace negotiations. 10 That success perhaps established unrealistic expectations in NATO about airpower's value as a deterrent to Serb policies in Kosovo. Some argue that the increasingly successful Croat and Bosnian ground war against the Serbs, combined with airpower, influenced the negotiations more effectively than airpower alone. However, the US political leadership was not prepared to commit large numbers of ground troops for a peace enforcement operation in either Bosnia or Kosovo. Precision weapons in airpower provided the essential element to meet the challenge of proportionality and make the intervention politically feasible. In his air campaign study of the Balkans, Colonel Robert Owen's assessment is clear:
Precision guided munitions (PGM) made DELIBERATE FORCE possible…Precision weapons gave NATO airmen the ability to conceive and execute a major air campaign that was quick, potent, and that likely would not kill people or destroy property to an extent that would cause world opinion to rise against and terminate the operation…Had NATO and UN leaders expected enough collateral damage to give the Serbs a political lever, they probably could not have approved initiation of DELIBERATE FORCE, or, if it had begun, they probably could not have sustained it politically for long. national interests at stake. The danger lies in political leaders relying on airpower to remedy jus in bello proportionality issues, at the expense of weighing the jus ad bellum proportionality decisions for the long term. In other words, morally and politically it's easier to intervene with airpower thinking that it provides a "cleaner" and quicker option. In fact, an air war might be morally cleaner in avoiding collateral damage, and politically more palatable in the short term, but may not be decisive in the long term. Reliance on airpower can invite intervention without the national moral commitment to self-sacrifice for that decision in the long term. Self-sacrifice means a long-term commitment of money, troops, and resources to maintain stability in the region, in addition to possible combatant casualties. This sacrifice may be required in a humanitarian intervention to establish favorable conditions for other agencies and indigenous sources to address issues underlying the problem.
Proportionality and Kosovo
The Whatever motive best explains the atrocities committed by the Serbs after NATO started its bombing, no Albanians say NATO was wrong. Those Western critics who condemn the bombing for turning a humanitarian crisis into a catastrophe get short shrift in Kosovo. Albanians were the primary victims and there is an almost universal feeling that, although the price was far bloodier than expected, it was worth paying for the sake of liberation from Serb rule.
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In sum, in Kosovo, the air campaign was a morally and politically proportional choice.
However, a credible commitment to send ground troops, coupled with airpower, more appropriately supports the decision to get involved at all. That commitment would have reflected careful consideration of long term political proportionality and a decision in favor of long-term improvements. Previous NATO jitters about political proportionality in the Balkans had damaged its credibility for action with the Serb government. Milosevic only needed to look to Somalia and the Bosnian war for predictors of US political resolve to accept long-term involvement in the face of friendly losses. The lack of commitment by the US to accept casualties will continue to be used by potential adversaries in the future to deter our involvement in largely "humanitarian" matters. Political proportionality may outweigh moral just cause in these cases.
Reasonable Chance of Success and Last Resort
The previous discussion of jus ad bellum proportionality in Kosovo only scratches the surface of moral and political issues in interventions. In addition, proportionality will require constant reassessment as the operation continues and political objectives may change as a result-another onerous characteristic of interventions. The jus ad bellum principles of reasonable chance of success and last resort are also important tests for intervention. Reasonable chance of success incorporates realistic limitations that constrain moral action in all cases. The operation must offer realistic opportunity to succeed within the test of proportionality. For example, military intervention in China, North Korea, or Russia to stop human rights abuses could likely escalate into a devastating conflict or even nuclear war. The adverse effects for noncombatants and combatants alike are certain. That defeats proportionality and does not offer a reasonable chance of success to change policy except by a costly war.
Last resort is a related notion, but can be difficult to meet in cases of extreme human necessity. Diplomatic and economic measures should normally be exhausted before resorting to force. However, in cases where human suffering or genocidal acts are occurring, waiting to exhaust these methods compounds the suffering to an unacceptable level. In 1994, the genocidal rampage of Hutu extremists in Rwanda resulted in the deaths of over half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 100 days.
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The massacre could have been averted with a military intervention:
….Tutsis and moderate Hutus were hacked to death by extremist mobs, generally armed only with machetes. A competent infantry force could have subdued the murderous minions of the Hutu extremists; indeed, the UN peacekeeping commander on the scene at the time, Canadian Gen. Romeo Dallaire, believed the worst of the killings could have been prevented had his 2,500-strong force been augmented to a total size between 5,000 and 8,000.
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In this case, last resort would have been a moot point since thousands would be dead in the time taken to find diplomatic or economic solutions. Further, with failed states or a country in political disarray, diplomatic or economic measures may be empty methods. In such cases the humanitarian intervention poses competing moral and political values as well. A reasonable chance of success for stopping the tragedy in the short term is morally and politically high. The test of last resort is met because no other means is effective. In the long run, however, reasonable chance of success may be politically impossible if conflict resolution mechanisms in the country are absent, even with long term outside assistance. Moral commitment to help becomes politically unfeasible. Michael Mandelbaum observes, "The task of alleviating suffering inevitably involves political consequences when suffering has political causes….Stopping a war requires settling the questions-political questions-over which it is being fought." 19 Somalia, after Operation RESTORE HOPE, offers a good example. In this case, an absence of political cohesion among the population is the political question. Until the country can muster enough internal political unity, coherent leadership, and material resources to benefit from long term outside assistance, its status as a state seems out of reach.
Reasonable Chance of Success, Last Resort and Kosovo
Unlike Somalia, Operation ALLIED FORCE passes the test for reasonable chance of success and last resort in the short term, but may fail reasonable chance of success in the long term. Morally, the decision to conduct an air war offered a proportional opportunity to expel 
Part 4 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS -PDD 25 AND FIVE GUIDELINES
In concluding the analysis of reasonable chance of success and last resort, it is important to point out that the US and United Kingdom developed some political guidelines for the complex affairs of humanitarian interventions. These guidelines hope to ascertain when a "politically" reasonable chance of success in an intervention is present. On 3 May 1994, after US experiences in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, President Clinton signed a Presidential Directive (PDD 25) "U.S.
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." This directive provides criteria to address the conflicting moral and political issues and establish a framework for US involvement.
It first establishes that:
Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. climate. Ambiguity associated with extra political "fog and friction" introduces increased risk to successful prosecution of the conflict. Further, as discussed earlier, a clearly defined endpoint may not be possible. Kosovo will take a long time to bridge its ethnic divisions, if ever. The political proportionality of US involvement will assuredly be reassessed against moral proportionality there in the future.
Interestingly, the PDD includes a caveat to eliminate the discipline of strictly meeting each criteria before proceeding:
These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
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This caveat acknowledges that peacekeeping doesn't easily conform to a standardized recipe for action and gives political wiggle room to respond accordingly. The danger, of course, is an apparently incoherent foreign policy. Unlike peacekeeping, the ideal humanitarian intervention would permit rescuers a rapid response to correct a problem and then withdrawal of forces- 
Part 5 Summary
There is no single right answer for humanitarian intervention. Good or bad, the information explosion on the planet brings harsh realities of the human condition into our living rooms. US response to this information is limited in legal, political, and moral dimensions and Operation ALLIED FORCE clearly exemplifies the depth of those dimensions.
Respect for state sovereignty introduces the first legal dilemma to consider before taking military action to intervene. Most states recognize moral correctness in observing international law as a critical restraint on state behavior in the international system. One can look at the active state arguments for legal legitimacy in humanitarian interventions like Kosovo to affirm this.
Respect for sovereignty is reflected in its written protection in the UN Charter, as well as its valued place in customary international law. Sovereignty provides protection for political communities to self-determine and govern their own affairs. However, equally valued are human rights for individuals within those communities. The trends in international human rights law, the spirit of the UN Charter-eloquently referenced by Kofi Annan in his remarks, and natural law as the fundamental basis of natural law, suggest that state sovereignty cannot replace important individual human rights. The UN Charter fails to adequately resolve the unique conflicts of these ideals in humanitarian interventions. Operation ALLIED FORCE evoked important legal controversies over these conflicting principles, but fails to meet strict legal standards for legitimacy under the UN Charter as it exists today.
Moral dimensions to humanitarian interventions emerge through the lens of jus ad bellum standards of just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance of success, and last resort. Just cause is usually easy to establish, especially with well-documented atrocities, but proportionality offers the more challenging principle. Proportionality regarding jus in bello standards, or how the war is conducted, affects the jus ad bellum proportionality standard. The interventions' objectives are to end suffering, not to create more. A military conflict will create some suffering and proportionality must be constantly weighed as it progresses. The jus in bello issues, like precision weapons and selective targeting in the Operation ALLIED FORCE air campaign, are very influential considerations for political leaders weighing proportionality.
Reasonable chance of success and last resort are difficult as well. A reasonable chance of success suggests that conditions creating the suffering should be corrected to prevent further occurrence. This leads to conflict resolution-likely to be a long-term commitment in the current global environment. Kosovo will require long term involvement and may ultimately fail to resolve its wounds from the war. Time will reveal the answer. Last resort may be impossible to meet if the intensity of the atrocities negates extensive diplomatic and economic measures.
The mass killings in Rwanda demonstrated the urgency of quick action. Likewise, Kosovo could not endure protracted reluctance for action, considering NATO's diplomatic history with Milosevic.
Operation ALLIED FORCE met the standards for just cause. The air campaign was a morally and politically proportional choice to prosecute the intervention, however ground troops should not have been ruled out to satisfy political proportionality. Air power is not a panacea to messy interventions. Morally, a credible commitment to the intervention demanded a willingness to accept casualties. This concern for losses, while morally responsible and Interpretations of whether jus ad bellum standards are met constitute a moral judgement. In sum, Former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar accurately foreshadowed the challenges of Kosovo, eight years before Operation ALLIED FORCE:
We must now ponder this issue in a manner that is at once prudent and bold. In a prudent manner, because the principles of sovereignty cannot be radically challenged without international chaos quickly ensuing. In a bold manner, because we have probably reached a state in the ethical and psychological evolution of Western civilization in which the massive and deliberate violation of human rights will no longer be tolerated. It falls to us, therefore, to forge a new concept, one which marries law and morality. 
